Augmented Virtue Ethics

May 2024

In studying the topic of Virtue Ethics it is typical to doubt Aristotle’s proposal as
falling weak to the concept of “moral luck,” also known as “moral fragility,” in which one’s
ability to be good depends on circumstances outside of their control. A specific example of
this would be cases of intellectual disabilities. There is evidence that Aristotle may doubt
whether those with Down syndrome, for example, would be able to achieve the virtue of
intelligence and those surrounding it. The worry is that this may compound into an inability
to be morally “good” under Virtue Ethics. However, it is certainly possible—and even
rational—to understand Aristotle’s theories in a way that circumvents this issue, instead
developing a version of the belief system that ensures anyone may achieve virtuosity in
anything, regardless of outside factors. This variation can be derived from the original
system, though not without agreeing with some of the criticism that it receives. This is key to
the framework of Aristotle’s work. Its dependency on the individual and the context in which
they exist allows for a sort of versatility that is necessary to employ. To summarize: Virtue
Ethics’s weaknesses (if they exist) to moral fragility in the case of the mentally disabled do
not single-handedly overturn the trustworthiness of the system. This is because of certain
falsities surrounding intelligence as a virtue, alternative ways of playing out reason, and the
adaptability inherent within the framework of Aristotle’s theories.

To understand Aristotle’s theories, it’s important to first understand how they differ
from other schools of thought. While some may argue for an innate, discoverable set of
laws, Aristotle disagreed. He seemed to believe that the ability to be good relied much more
on a sort of “know-how” acquired through deliberate training. One could cultivate this
expertise in a variety of ways, but Aristotle proposes that it is best achieved by perfecting
the most “human” quality within us: reason, or the ability to determine (and act on) a
precise, “golden” mean between a deficient option and an excessive one. To become a
perfect moral exemplar is to apply superb reason to a list of “virtues,” or characteristics held
by the perfect human being. Conversation is often used to illustrate this. Someone who is
proficient in the virtue of conversation should be able to exemplify reason to its grandest
scope and decide, based on the factors in play, a precise mean between being rudely
outspoken and being unnecessarily quiet. This may take the form of knowing exactly what
to say and when to say it to ensure one’s peers are getting whatever they need out of the
discussion. Keep in mind that virtues differ from so-called “natural powers.” These are
qualities found in people that do not require a mastery of reason for one to become
proficient in them. To better understand this, think of the five senses as examples of natural
powers; one who is born without the ability to see does not have the ability to “reason” their
way into 20/20 vision, and similar things are true of sight, smell, touch, and hearing.
Proficiency in a natural power is independent of its use, but perfecting a virtue requires
consistent training. Aristotle appeals to common sense to prove this; any skill that could be
regarded as “virtuous,” by definition, must display the user’s mastery in using reason within
that skill’s context. It makes sense that continued exposure to that context and consistency
in reason are the steps necessary to achieve a certain virtue. Therefore any ability that does
not meet these requirements or which cannot be enhanced through these processes must
not be a virtue. So, while eyesight itself may be a natural power, the skill of perception is in
fact a virtuous one. This necessary distinction informs the problem that Aristotle is often
accused of running into: the problem of moral luck. It is a thoughtful complaint that
addresses Aristotle’s implication that the mastery of some virtues rely on factors entirely
outside of some subject’s control. Some common examples of this would be the claim that
someone born with an intellectual disability, in poverty, or without access to viable mentors
may struggle or even fail to become virtuous, no matter how perseverant they are. It’s often
depicted that Aristotle would accept this point and concede that Virtue Ethics is elitist.
However, a closer look may reveal that moral fragility is not nearly as detrimental to Virtue
Ethics as it is often depicted.

My case for Virtue Ethics disputes the claim that people with Down syndrome cannot
master the virtue of intelligence or those which rely on it. A couple of arguments go into
addressing this, including one appeal to semantics and one regarding virtuosity as a whole.
You see, there is evidence that “intelligence” in the previous sense is closer to a natural
power than a virtue. Following through with this hunch, I found some interpretations of
Aristotle’s work online that seem to imply that he would agree. Much like eyesight, one’s
capacity for information is often independent of reason. It would then follow that a lack of its
mastery is irrelevant to one’s moral character. This seems obvious; someone who is deaf is
not lesser in character because of it. As for virtues which rely on intelligence, it’s not
impossible nor unlikely that many of the obstacles that may arise in achieving these virtues
could be aided through the use of other skills or qualities that are not impaired by the
disability. To illustrate this, I’ll refer back to two examples that I mentioned earlier—the virtue
of conversation and the natural power of hearing. Using the same logic as seen above, one
could argue that a hard of hearing or deaf person may be unable to master the virtue of
conversation. However, this statement can be proven untrue as these individuals still easily
hold their own and even thrive in conversations using ASL or written/typed language. One
can still master the virtue even though it “relies” on the natural power of hearing. With this in
mind, it would be wrong to claim that those with Down syndrome cannot master virtues like
ingenuity or comprehension. There are other qualities—natural powers such as imagination
and virtues like observation—that can achieve the work necessary in place of an impaired
intelligence. I will also make a brief mention here that there are a few dangling concerns of
mine that I won’t otherwise get to, and I’d like to address at least one of them. To me, it feels
as though Virtue Ethics may not be unique in its failures to moral fragility, even if they do
exist. Or, if it is unique in its failures, it seems as though other schools of philosophy seem
to run into even less-acceptable conclusions to avoid it. In my own research on this topic, I
discovered that Kantianism, for example, may make the accusation that those who cannot
comprehend or utilize its laws (perhaps due to a disability of some kind) would no longer
qualify as human. In this sense, moral luck manifests itself as a randomization of whether
one even deserves to be included in ethical discussion. I will not dive too deep into this
rabbit hole as it does not do much to defend my claim against Virtue Ethics’ failures, though
I do think it important to consider when comparing these belief systems.

Still, there are those who may continue to insist that Virtue Ethics fails the test
against moral fragility. One could rationally accuse my communication example of not
carrying over to intelligence. Or perhaps it’s an oversimplification that distorts the facts too
far. They may point out that, if one can still achieve the virtue of communication without the
ability to hear, then maybe it’s wrong to assert that communication “relies” on the ability to
hear in the first place. This would seem to depart from the spirit of the original case. If there
is a virtue that relies wholly on natural intelligence and which other abilities cannot bolster, I
fail to address it. This is a clever insight, and to address it I’d like to meet the concern that
these virtues whose attainments depend on some quality or combination of qualities may be
outright impossible to reach given a lack of those qualities. However, I will also try to prove
that this concern ends up nullifying its own relevance and can thus be ignored. In fact, it
stirs up the very convenient idea that some virtues fall out of scope for any given person as
a result of circumstance. Allow me to propose a more extreme version of the argument in
question—imagine that someone is born lacking each and every natural power that is
necessary to communicate. They cannot see or hear any form of language and they cannot
move or make noise to address others, yet they still have whatever functions Aristotle
claims are necessary to make one “human”—primarily reason. There comes a point when it
seems as though their person no longer necessitates the virtue of reason. They will never
be in a scenario in which their character would be hurt or helped by expertise in
communication. Furthermore, they would be unable to use reason to advance this expertise
in any way. In this way, the ability to communicate now seems to lack every quality that
once defined it as a virtue. It would be similar to accusing an atheist as lacking the virtue of
religious faith, or the last man on Earth as lacking the virtue of social conduct—there is no
situation in which the desired “know-how” would present itself as useful, much less
embodied by some perfect human being in the same shoes. Seemingly, the once-virtue no
longer qualifies as such, and it falls out of the affected person’s scope of what is needed to
perfect their existence. Another counterargument to my claim may cite my other contention
regarding intelligence’s place as a virtue. Rather, my insistence that intelligence is not a
virtue. One could point out that this is only valid when referring to intelligence as it pertains
to one’s capacity and efficiency in attaining knowledge and/or applying it, which is merely
one of many definitions that could pertain to this debate. I’d like to once again indulge this
agitation. Allow us to consider some scenario in which the definition of intelligence is
instead one which would heavily support or otherwise police one’s ability to reason. In such
a case, I will concede that it comes time to acknowledge that this really is a considerable
dent in Aristotle’s teachings. Understand, though, that it does not necessarily spell the end
for Virtue Ethics. Instead, it opens up new pathways for one to assess outsider theories that
fit within Aristotle’s framework and which may fill in these gaps. One of such gaps is the
seeming blind spot in Aristotle’s teachings explaining how/why all humans should share
reason as their basis for virtuosity in the first place. I would find it realistic to propose that
reason should not be a basis for virtuosity within those whose rationale is hurt by some
disability. If we go through and reject this presumption that those with major impairments
share the same basis for virtuosity—or even that all humans share this basis—then we’d be
given the freedom to attribute their ability to become virtuous to some other essential quality
within them. Qualities such as that to exhibit meaningful emotion, to ascertain qualia, or
even a combination of these things and more. These traits are vital to the human condition,
similarly to reason, but would not be impaired among such individuals. This is to say that
someone whose disability affects their potential to reason may still thrive under the skeleton
of Virtue Ethics, though its practice may look different from that which those who do not
have such an impairment follow. To go into further detail would make it necessary to
consider Aristotle’s theories on telos and arete, which I will avoid for now. However, I do
heavily recommend considering those theories for further insight as to where these
proposals may fit in. I will admit that this can seem like a stretch, and Aristotle himself may
not advocate for this analysis. In fact, it may very well be true that he would doubt whether
people in poverty or those with Down syndrome have an equal chance within his system.
That said, I propose this interpretation to build off of the ideas that Aristotle put forth and to
promote Virtue Ethics—not its creator.